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The article is devoted to the comparative analysis of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses 
in international procedural law. The paper focuses, firstly, on a detailed analysis of the 
national and international approaches to the nature and interpretation of asymmetric 
jurisdiction clauses within international civil procedure, and, secondly, on the rules on 
interpretation, validity and enforcement of such clauses under different jurisdictions 
and private international law in general. After examining the accumulated case law 
and theoretical material, particular attention is paid to the issue that currently there 
is a number of different grounds for recognition of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses as 
valid. Although Russian courts tend to invalidate such clauses, the issue has not been 
unambiguously resolved and requires reconsideration of the established approaches in 
light of the recent trends on international level. Thus, particular attention is paid to the 
highly problematic and contradictory aspects of unilateral dispute resolution provisions 
under the general principles of law, including autonomy, mutuality and equality of the 
parties. The article proposes to reconsider the most typical arguments for invalidating 
such clauses, both in terms of substantive and procedural principles. Analysis of these 
issues is of key theoretical and practical importance for the effective evolution of modern 
arbitration and litigation practices not only in Russia but all over the world.
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Introduction
Considering the current increase in cross-border disputes between representatives 
of different jurisdictions, various issues of international dispute resolution are 
becoming highly relevant nowadays. in this regard, business entities, guided by 
strictly pragmatic approaches to conducting their business, seek not only to prevent 
adverse outcomes by establishing additional guarantees and security mechanisms, 
but also to minimise the unpredictability of the outcome in cases of disputes arising 
out of contracts. Concerns about exposure to venue and enforcement risks have 
significant economic implications and may inhibit transactions to the extent that 
leading market actors may be dissuaded from entering into them because the 
optimal forum may be legally or practically unavailable. thus, in their effort to transfer 
jurisdiction to more favourable forums or even use alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, parties tend to include jurisdiction or dispute resolution clauses in their 
contracts. recent trends in this regard show that parties to international contracts 
more often choose complex jurisdictional clauses that not only combine elements of 
arbitration and prorogation agreements but also stipulate non-standard allocation 
of their rights, as reflected in the concept of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses.
to date, no legal doctrine has provided a universal definition of asymmetric 
clauses, but typically such clauses provide options that accord one of the parties to 
a dispute the right to demand arbitration or insist upon ordinary litigation.1 within 
1  hans smit, The Unilateral Arbitration Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 20(3) American review of interna-
tional Arbitration 391, 394 (2009).
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VIII (2020) Issue 3 86
legal doctrines, asymmetric clauses are also referred to as “one-sided,” “one-way,” 
“hybrid jurisdiction” or “option jurisdiction” clauses, as well as “non-mutual agreements 
to arbitrate.”2 despite the great number of approaches to terminology, an asymmetric 
jurisdiction clause, by its nature and rationale, can be defined as a clause providing that, 
should a dispute arise, one of the parties to the contract may choose the adjudicatory 
forum. typically, the clause will provide for arbitration or court adjudication at the 
election of the privileged party.3 that said, the choice of forum is inserted in the clause 
a priori and is latent until the envisioned dispute arises out of the agreement.4
still, most questions concerning asymmetric jurisdiction clauses remain poorly 
studied, although the answers to them determine enforceability and validity of such 
clauses. Furthermore, in different jurisdictions, due to the objective differences in 
substantive and procedural laws, the approaches to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses 
also differ very significantly. the differing attitudes towards asymmetric clauses pose 
risk to their flexibility, diminished by the practical ambiguity of their actual effect.5 
thus, the most acute and urgent issue in this respect concerns the differences in 
approaches to the validity and enforceability of such clauses in different jurisdictions, 
which apply various lines of legal argumentation.
1. Grounds for Validity of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses  
Under National Laws
the most important question concerning asymmetric clauses is whether the 
national treatment will validate and enforce such clauses as they were tailored by 
the parties. in this light, the main aim of this section is to analyse as much case 
law indicating the national approaches to asymmetric clauses from a commercial 
perspective as was available, including decisions that were not rendered in 
a commercial setting but do concern asymmetric clauses and are thus relevant to 
the issues raised. the relevant case law is further classified by the nature of the main 
arguments on which the national courts base their decisions to either recognise 
unilateral forum clauses as valid or not.
1.1. Potestative Conditions
Potestative conditions form a continental legal concept, under which it is consi-
dered that clauses dependent on acts purely within the sphere of control of the 
2  Please note that all the mentioned terms are used as synonyms in this paper.
3  Laurent Niddam, Unilateral Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Arbitration, 5 Arbitration and dispute 
resolution Law Journal 147 (1997).
4  deyan draguiev, Unilateral Jurisdiction Clauses: The Case for Invalidity, Severability or Enforceability, 31(1) 
Journal of international Arbitration 23 (2014).
5  Marie Bérard et al., Unilateral Option Clauses in Arbitration: An International Overview, Practical Law, 23 
June 2017 (May 7, 2020), available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-535-3743.
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debtor should be void, since the debtor may unilaterally effect changes in the position 
of the other party and even, more importantly, evade its obligations. historically, 
French case law was the first jurisdiction that invalidated asymmetric clauses by 
applying the concept of “condition potestative.” Although the French tendency with 
regard to enforceability of asymmetric provisions in jurisdiction agreements appears 
less obvious due to the inconsistent judicial practice and awareness in this respect 
within legal doctrines,6 it is worth to mention that originally French courts recognised 
the validity of bilateral option clauses. in particular, this approach was taken in cases 
where the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter the Brussels Convention),7 expressly 
allowing parties to agree on asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, was not applicable.8
For instance, a forum clause with asymmetric elements was upheld in Sicaly v. 
Grasso,9 where only the French company was granted the right to submit the dispute 
to arbitration, despite the default rule in the contract that referred to litigation. in 
refusing to invalidate the clause, the French courts held that the clause explicitly 
demonstrated that the dutch party had agreed on the term that disputes within the 
scope of the agreement could be settled by means of arbitration and had therefore 
implicitly waived its rights under Article 14 of the French Civil Code.10 though this 
appears to be the exceptional case that has been considered in France, scholars 
agree that the ruling was correct, stressing the absence of grounds for such clauses 
not to be upheld under French law.11
however, turning to the concept of potestative conditions, the most serious 
discussions in the professional and academic environment throughout the european 
union were brought by the ruling of the Court of Cassation in Rothschild,12 which 
concerned the dispute between the Luxembourg bank and its investor who placed 
6  Cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence, Chambre civile 2, 11 octobre 1988, 88-3806; Cour de cassation, Chambre 
commerciale, 24 avril 1990, 88-19.877.
7  1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Apr. 15, 2020), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/tXt/?uri=CeLeX: 
41968A0927(01).
8  Барбе Ж., Рошер П. Опционные оговорки о способах разрешения споров: анализ с точки зрения 
французского и английского права // Вестник международного коммерческого арбитража. 2011. 
№ 1(3). С. 114–115 [Jerome Barbe & Peter rocher, Option Clauses on Dispute Resolution: Analysis from 
the Point of View of French and English Law, 1(3) Bulletin of international Commercial Arbitration 110, 
114–115 (2011)].
9  Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 15 mai 1974, 72-14.706.
10  Nicolas Bouchardie & Céline tran, Arbitration in France, Practical Law (Apr. 15, 2020), available at https://
uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-536-9585?originationContext=document&transitiontype=d
ocumentitem&contextdata=%28sc.default%29&comp=pluk.
11  simon Nesbitt & henry Quinlan, The Status and Operation of Unilateral or Optional Arbitration Clauses, 
22(1) Arbitration international 133 (2006).
12  Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 26 septembre 2012, 11-26.022.
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a deposit through the French branch. the agreement between the parties contained 
a clause according to which the Luxembourg courts were given the exclusive 
jurisdiction in respect of any disputes arising, and the bank was entitled to initiate 
a trial either at the place of residence of the investor (i.e. spain) or before any 
other competent state court in the absence of the above-mentioned propagation 
agreement. in 2009, the investor announced significant financial losses and brought 
the claim in Paris against the Luxembourg bank. the trial and appeal courts 
recognised their competence to consider the dispute, stressing that it is prohibited 
for the bank to select whatever jurisdiction it wishes. the Court of Cassation upheld 
this approach, recognizing the clause as incomplete and inconsistent with the 
purpose envisaged under Article 23 of the Council regulation No. 44/2001 eC on 
Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Cases of 22 december 2000 (hereinafter the Brussels i regulation).13 however, the 
rationale shifted to pointing out that the clause constituted a potestative condition 
in granting solely the bank the right to bring action either in a court at the place of 
residence of the client or any other court that has competence to consider the case. 
Meanwhile, the investor was granted only the right to bring action in the courts of 
Luxembourg, which impaired the objectiveness and predictability of the agreement.14 
thus, the action brought in the French courts was recognised as legitimate and the 
asymmetric clause was invalidated.
Considering this argumentation from a legal perspective, it seems rather peculiar. 
First, according to the widespread viewpoint, Article 23 of the Brussels i regulation 
allows parties to conclude asymmetric agreements. At the same time, an agreement 
whereby one of the parties is granted, upon presentation of a suit, the right of 
choice between the court specified in the agreement and another court that has 
competence in the absence of an agreement, while the other party can sue only in 
the court specified in the agreement, should be clear and unambiguous. in other 
words, parties are expressly allowed to decide on jurisdiction which is not exclusive. 
second, the provisions of a legislative act of the european union should be interpreted 
autonomously from the national legislation of Member states.15 Furthermore, while 
the governing law of the agreement in Rothschild was the law of Luxemburg, it was 
interpreted under the purely French doctrine of potestative conditions, according 
to which obligations entered into under a condition subject to the will of one of the 
parties are null and void by virtue of Article 1174 of the French Civil Code.
13  Council regulation (eC) No. 44/2001 of 22 december 2000 on Jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Apr. 15, 2020), available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/eN/tXt/?uri=CeLeX%3A32001r0044. Please note that this regulation 
is no longer in force; it remained in effect until 9 January 2015.
14  Marie-elodie Ancel et al., Reflections on One-Sided Jurisdiction Clauses in International Litigation (About 
the Rothschild Decision, French Cour de Cassation, 26 September 2012), 148 Banque & droit 3 (2013).
15  draguiev 2014, at 38.
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the French supreme Court did not take the above arguments into account and 
was most likely guided by the fact that the option right was too broadly defined. 
however, even if this interpretation is applicable, it is still inconsistent with earlier 
case law of the european Court of Justice, which held that
it is sufficient that the clause states the objective factors on the basis of 
which the parties have agreed to choose a court or courts to which they wish 
to submit their disputes.16
Furthermore, the emphasis in the ruling of the Court of Cassation was made precisely 
on the nature of the agreement itself, not on the fact that the agreement was concluded 
with the consumer as a “weaker” party. the court also did not refer to violation of the 
principle of adversarial proceedings or the parties having unequal procedural status. 
Given all these facts, Rothschild was deservedly criticised17 for not referring the matter 
to the Court of Justice of the european union for a preliminary ruling.18
Nonetheless, the decision itself has triggered the risk that may arise in the event 
of an asymmetric clause with the option to settle a dispute in court or by means of 
arbitration. specifically, the approach of Rothschild was later upheld in ICH v. Crédit 
Suisse19 by the French court that similarly invalidated the asymmetric clause as being 
of disparate nature.20 in this case, the dispute concerned repayment of the debt to 
Credit suisse, seated in Zurich, by investments of the French company, which in 
turn were secured by its english agent. the facility agreements included a dispute 
resolution clause, according to which the bank enjoyed the exclusive right to bring 
claims before any courts, while the choice of forum for the borrower was limited to 
Zurich or the location of the bank’s branch. As a result of low investment returns, 
société civile immobilière iCh (iCh), the successor of the French company, initiated 
proceedings against the banks before the court of Angers, claiming the facility was 
structurally unviable. Both the trial and appeal courts declared their incompetence 
to consider the dispute since the plaintiff had not objected to the jurisdiction 
designated under the clause. Nonetheless, the Court of Cassation overruled these 
decisions based on violation of the legal certainty principle as well as regulation 
under the Convention on Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
16  Coreck Maritime GmbH v. Handelsveem BV and others, Case C-387/98, [2000] e.C.r. i-09337.
17  See, e.g., richard Fentiman, Unilateral Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe, 24(1) Cambridge Law Journal 
26 (2013).
18  See treaty on the Functioning of the european union, Art. 267(1)(b) and (3) (Apr. 15, 2020), available 
at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/eN/tXt/?uri=CeLeX%3A12012e%2FtXt.
19  Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 mars 2015, 13-27.264.
20  See Brooke A. Marshall, Imbalanced Jurisdiction Clauses under the Lugano Convention: Judgment of the 
French Cour de Cassation of 25 March 2015, 24(2) Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht 515 (2016).
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Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter the Lugano Convention),21 
since the right of the bank to choose the forum was not based on objective elements. 
it is interesting to mention that the case involved consideration of Article 23 of the 
Lugano Convention (applicable to jurisdiction agreements designating a non-eu 
Lugano Convention state), which is identical to the rules prescribed under Article 23 
of the Brussels i regulation.
Considering the approach of the French courts in Rothschild, it is more interesting 
to analyse the practice within the italian legal system, which also recognises the 
institution of potestative conditions under Article 1355 of the italian Civil Code.22 
Like in France, historically italian case law tends to recognise validity of unilateral 
clauses.23 this approach still remains, as can be illustrated by recent cases considered 
barely a year before Rothschild.24 For instance, in Grinka in liquidazione v. Intesa San 
Paolo, Simest, HSBC,25 the supreme Court of italy upheld the asymmetric clause, 
in accordance with which the company agreed to the jurisdiction of the english 
courts only and the bank was granted the option to submit claims either to the 
courts of italy or other courts that can be recognised as a competent forum under 
applicable international treaties. in this case, the italian supreme Court pointed 
out that such a clause was consistent with the Brussels i regulation, recognizing 
the parties’ discretion to include such clauses that can be characterised as non-
exclusive in nature.26 Although the clause in question was relatively similar to the 
one in Rothschild, the italian supreme Court recognised the validity of the clause, 
granting only one party the right to choose the forum, although such choice was 
exclusively at the discretion of that party.
however, the approach of italian courts is still an exception rather than the 
rule regarding the application of potestative conditions that are used to declare 
asymmetric clauses invalid in the european union. this may be substantiated by the 
case law of Bulgaria, which although to date has not dealt with disputes arising out 
of asymmetric clauses under cross-border agreements, has a precedent of domestic 
nature on the issue. still, the Bulgarian supreme Court’s arguments allow to draw 
a conclusion on potential regulation of unilateral clauses in relation to foreign 
21  Convention on Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters (Apr. 15, 2020), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/eN/ALL/?uri=C
eLeX%3A22007A1221%2803%29.
22  Claudio Perrella, Italian Supreme Court Considers Unilateral Jurisdiction Clauses, Mondaq, 8 April 2013 
(May 7, 2020), available at http://www.mondaq.com/italy/x/231358/Arbitration+dispute+resolution/
italian+supreme+Court+Considers+unilateral+Jurisdiction+Clauses.
23  Corte di Cassazione, No. 2096, Judgment, 22 October 1970, Giustizia Civile Mass., 1970, p. 1103.
24  Corte d’Appello di Milano, Sportal Italia v. Microsoft Corp., Judgment, 22 september 2011.
25  Corte di Cassazione, Grinka in liquidazione v. Intesa San Paolo, Simest, HSBC, No. 5705, Judgment, 11 April 
2012.
26  Perrella 2013.
VASILY BAKUMENKO 91
economic contracts. in particular, the Bulgarian supreme Court in its judgment of 
2 september 201127 declared invalid the asymmetric clause with an arbitration option 
providing for the lender’s right to bring claims in different arbitration institutions 
with their seat in Bulgaria.
After the dispute arose, the lender referred the matter to the Arbitration Court of 
the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and industry, which recognised its competence 
over the dispute and decided that the borrowers were jointly and severally liable to 
the lender and obliged to pay the amount of the debt and interest. the borrowers 
appealed to the supreme Court of Bulgaria with a request for the annulment of the 
arbitration award, referring to the lack of competence of the arbitration institution 
for the consideration of the dispute. in support of the claims, the claimant pointed 
out that the arbitration clause contradicted the fundamental principles of good faith 
and procedural equality, and therefore should be invalidated.
the Bulgarian supreme Court ruled that the creditor’s right to choose, at its 
discretion, the body for resolving a dispute in which it can exercise its right to bring 
an action, fell under the category of potestative conditions. in view of the potential 
of enforcement of potestative conditions to cause damage to third parties, their 
existence is possible exclusively on grounds provided by law, but not as a result of 
contractual agreements.28 Guided by the above points, the court ruled that the clause 
violated the law by granting one of the parties the unilateral right to choose the 
body to resolve the dispute and was invalid in accordance with Article 26(1) of the 
Bulgarian Law on Contracts and Obligations, under which all contracts concluded 
in violation or circumvention of the law are considered void. thus, it can be stated 
that the reasoning that guided the Bulgarian supreme Court was very close to the 
argumentation presented in Rothschild.
hence, the analysis of the case law shows that the concept of potestative 
conditions, being of continental legal nature, is directly used in respect of invalidation 
of asymmetric clauses within european jurisdictions, although recently some of them 
have taken a contrary approach. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to identify the 
application of the potestative conditions principle as the only reason for invalidation 
of asymmetric clauses, since judicial practice often refers to other general principles 
of law, which are analysed below.
1.2. Equality of the Parties
As far as forum clauses with asymmetric options confer a wider array of rights 
only on one of the parties (i.e. an option to choose dispute resolution bodies), some 
27  Bulgarian supreme Court of Cassation, second Commercial Chamber, Commercial Case No. 1193/2010, 
Judgment No. 71, 2 september 2011.
28  Gilles Cuniberti, Bulgarian Court Strikes Down One Way Jurisdiction Clause, Conflict of Laws, 13 Novem-
ber 2012 (May 7, 2020), available at http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/bulgarian-court-strikes-down-one-
way-jurisdiction-clause/.
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jurisdictions, seeking to restore the balance of powers (which is deemed inviolable as 
will be illustrated below), resort to the principle of equality of the parties. the most 
striking example in this respect is evolution of the case law of russian courts. Before 
turning to the negative approach which evolved in russian jurisprudence, it should 
be noted that historically, as in some of the jurisdictions analysed above, russian 
courts held that asymmetric clauses are generally valid and legally effective.29
For instance, in Red Barn Capital LLC v. ZAO Factoring Company Eurocommerz,30 the 
court found that the asymmetric clause was consistent with the russian law. in this 
case, the contract included a clause that provided for LCiA arbitration, but with an 
exception that if one of the parties presents its objections to arbitration before the 
arbitrators are appointed, it could refer the dispute to a state court.31 in connection 
with a delay in the fulfilment of obligations, red Barn Capital LLC brought a claim in 
the Moscow Arbitrazh [Commercial] Court, which refused to consider the case and 
ceased the proceedings, citing lack of jurisdiction due to the arbitration agreement 
concluded between the parties. in the course of subsequent appeals, the higher 
courts upheld this position, ruling that the clause was valid and the claimant could 
choose to start proceedings in russian courts.32 in particular, it was decided that the 
facility agreement established a wider scope of rights to elect forum for the lender, 
thus finding it justifiable and feasible that the agreement was aimed to secure the 
interests of the party exposed to higher risk.
however, the ruling of the supreme Arbitrazh Court of 2012 marked a stark 
deviation from this approach,33 and subsequently many specialists and practitioners 
29  See, e.g., Постановления Федерального арбитражного суда Московского округа от 22 декабря 
2009 г. № КГ-A40/11983-09, от 23 декабря 2009 г. № КГ-A40/13340-09, от 12 января 2010 г. 
№ КГ-A40/14014-09 [rulings of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of the Moscow district of 22 december 
2009 No. kG-A40/11983-09, of 23 december 2009 No. kG-A40/13340-09, of 12 January 2010 
No. kG-A40/14014-09] (May 7, 2020) available at http://www.garant.ru.
30  Постановление Девятого арбитражного апелляционного суда от 22 сентября 2009 г. по делу 
№ A40-59745/09-63-478; Постановление Федерального арбитражного суда Московского округа 
от 28 декабря 2009 г. по делу № A40-59745/09-63-478 [ruling of the Ninth Arbitrazh Court of Appeal 
of 22 september 2009 in case No. A40-59745/09-63-478; ruling of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of the 
Moscow district of 28 december 2009 in case No. A40-59745/09-63-478] (May 7, 2020) available at 
http://www.garant.ru.
31  James stacey & Angela taylor, Unilateral Jurisdiction Clauses in the UK, international Financial Law 
review, 23 september 2013 (May 7, 2020) available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/3258087/unilateral-
jurisdiction-clauses-in-the-uk.html.
32  Francesca Albert, Russia: An Improvement in Relations Between the Russian Courts and International 
Arbitration, kluwer Arbitration Blog, 28 February 2011 (May 7, 2020), available at http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2011/02/28/russia-an-improvement-in-relations-between-the-russian-courts-
and-international-arbitration/.
33  Постановление Президиума Высшего Арбитражного Суда Российской Федерации от 19 июня 
2012 г. № 1831/12 по делу № А40-49223/11-112-401 [ruling of the Presidium of the supreme 
Arbitrazh Court of the russian Federation of 19 June 2012 No. 1831/12 in case No. A40-49223/11-
112-401] (May 7, 2020) available at http://www.garant.ru.
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reasonably concluded that clauses of this kind are to be treated as invalid within 
russia. this concerned russkaya telefonnaya kompaniya CJsC (rtk) and sony 
ericsson Mobile Communications rus LLC (sony ericsson), a subsidiary of the foreign 
company incorporated in russia. the clause in question provided for arbitration 
through iCC in London by default, but sony ericsson was also granted the exclusive 
right to bring claims before any competent court to consider disputes arising out of 
the contract. in 2009, rtk brought the claim in Moscow seeking replacement mobile 
phones of required quality. Pointing out that the contract between the parties 
included an arbitration clause, sony ericsson objected to the court’s jurisdiction 
and the proceedings were terminated at the trial stage.34 this approach was upheld 
by the appeal and cassation courts, which found the clause consistent with the party 
autonomy principle. Nonetheless, in a supervisory proceeding initiated by rtk, the 
supreme Arbitrazh Court emphasised that equal rights of the parties to bring claims 
before any adjudicatory bodies and institutions constitute a legal guarantee of fair 
trial, citing the principles of adversarial proceedings and procedural equality. thus, 
considering “the general principles of protection of civil rights,” it was pointed out 
that a jurisdiction clause may not be discriminatory in nature, granting one party 
the right to present its claims before a competent state court and simultaneously 
restricting the other party. if included, such a clause violates the balance of the rights 
and shall be considered invalid. Accordingly, the restricted party is also entitled to 
bring claims before a competent state court in order to enjoy the right of judicial 
protection on the same grounds as its counterparty.
the ruling in this case received a lot of discussion and criticism from the russian 
legal community, including for lack of clarity on the interpretation of legislative 
provisions. First, it was not entirely clear whether the supreme Arbitrazh Court 
invalidated the clause entirely or just the part of it that was asymmetric in nature,35 
and second, whether the mechanism of this clause was converted into a bilateral 
one that grants both parties rights to choose between arbitration and litigation.36 
therefore, formally the clause was not invalidated, although its design was altered 
and the agreed mechanism of forum election was deprived of its purpose.
34  timur Aitkulov & Julia Popelysheva, The Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation Rules on the 
Validity of Dispute Resolution Clauses With a Unilateral Option, kluwer Arbitration Blog, 11 september 
2012 (May 7, 2020), available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/09/11/the-
supreme-arbitrazh-court-of-the-russian-federation-rules-on-the-validity-of-dispute-resolution-
clauses-with-a-unilateral-option/?doing_wp_cron=1598075183.5103440284729003906250.
35  See Ходыкин Р.М. Гибридные оговорки о рассмотрении спора // Вестник ВАС РФ. 2012. № 11. С. 64 
[roman M. khodykin, Hybdrid Jurisdiction Clauses, 11 Bulletin of the supreme Arbitrazh Court of the 
russian Federation 60, 64 (2012)].
36  Егоров А.В. Ассиметричные оговорки о разрешении споров судебная практика заменяет на сим-
метричные // Вестник международного коммерческого арбитража. 2012. № 2. С. 188. [Andrey v. 
egorov, Court Practice Replaces Asymmetric Dispute Resolution Clauses with Symmetric, 2 Bulletin of 
international Commercial Arbitration 186, 188 (2012)].
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even more ambiguity on regulation of asymmetric clauses within russia was 
brought by the decision of the supreme Court of the russian Federation of 2015, 
which after the judicial reform became the highest judicial authority.37 the case 
concerned a jurisdiction agreement that granted the claimant the choice to bring 
action before a state court or an arbitration court at its own discretion. Although the 
lower courts did not recognise the validity of such provisions, the russian supreme 
Court ruled that the clause was valid, as it did not indicate the specific party to whom 
the option was granted, but only pointed to the claimant as the option holder. 
Consequently, the phrase “at the choice of the claimant” does not violate the balance 
of rights of the parties, because at the conclusion of such arbitration agreements 
the parties to civil proceedings are not discriminated in terms of equality of their 
procedural rights, as it allows any of them to file a claim either with a competent 
court or an arbitration institution.
Considering the above, it can be concluded that russian courts have refused and 
would refuse to enforce and recognise asymmetric clauses as violating the principle 
of equality. recently, the supreme Court of the russian Federation confirmed this 
approach in its report on court practice for 2018, stressing that asymmetric clauses 
shall be considered invalid to the extent that they provide for inequality of the 
parties in the right to choose a forum.38 Although the review does not formally have 
a precedent, it provides valuable guidance on the approach that russian courts are 
likely to take in relation to asymmetric arbitration agreements. still, parties may 
include a broader clause providing special options not for a particular party, but 
rather for a status of this party should a dispute arise. Although such mechanisms can 
hardly be considered asymmetric in terms of their function, they offer an opportunity 
to use atypical dispute resolution provisions for parties in their relations.
A similar approach to the invalidity of asymmetric clauses can be illustrated by 
German practice, where asymmetric clauses as contractual arrangements are not 
considered invalid in general. in particular, from a procedural perspective, German 
arbitration law does not establish restrictions on asymmetric mechanisms as such.39 
As for contractual regulation, the only applicable rule states that a clause is invalid 
if it contradicts public policy (sec. 138 of the German Civil Code). At the same time, 
if an asymmetric clause is incorporated in the general terms (i.e. represents an 
37  Определение Верховного Суда Российской Федерации от 27 мая 2015 г. № 310-ЭС14-5919 по 
делу № А62-1635/2014 [decision of the supreme Court of the russian Federation No. 310-es14-5919 
of 27 May 2015 in case No. A62-1635/2014] (May 7, 2020) available at http://www.garant.ru.
38  Обзор практики рассмотрения судами дел, связанных с выполнением функций содействия 
и контроля в отношении третейских судов и международных коммерческих арбитражей (утв. 
Президиумом Верховного Суда Российской Федерации 26 декабря 2018 г.) [review of Judicial Practice 
in Cases related to the Fulfillment of the Functions of Assistance and Control in relation to Arbitration 
Courts and international Commercial Arbitrations, approved by the Presidium of the supreme Court of 
the russian Federation on 26 december 2018] (May 7, 2020) available at http://www.garant.ru.
39  Nesbitt & Quilan 2006, at 147.
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agreement of adhesion), it can be invalidated if it is inconsistent with the principle 
of good faith and unreasonably disadvantages the other party to the contract. thus, 
the main difference between asymmetric clauses included in standard and negotiated 
agreements is that in standard forms the court may only invoke invalidity of the entire 
clause, while clauses in negotiated contracts are subject to partial invalidation. in 
particular, the court can interpret the clause in such a way that the parties agreed to 
arbitration or litigation without limitations, although they know that such limitations 
are invalid.40 however, court practice shows that sometimes German courts invalidated 
asymmetric clauses on the basis of equality, especially in cases where the imbalance 
of the parties’ rights was striking.41 similarly, with regard to domestic arbitration, the 
German supreme Court applied national regulations to invalidate a clause granting 
only one party the choice between different means to resolve the dispute.42
despite the absence of case law on the validity and enforceability of asymmetric 
clauses in Polish jurisprudence, legal doctrines and recent changes in the Polish 
legislation provide an opportunity to draw certain conclusions and make certain 
assumptions regarding the application of the principle of equality of parties in 
respect of asymmetric clauses, as in russia and Germany. in particular, in 2005, 
Poland adopted a new arbitration statute,43 which is based on the provisions of 
the uNCitrAL Model Law. in accordance with Article 1161(2) of the Polish Civil 
Procedure Code, arbitration agreements that violate the equality principle, including 
those that grant only one party the right to bring action in an arbitral or state court, 
are invalid. this rule arises out of Article 32(1) of the Constitution of Poland, which 
declares universal equality before the law. initially, according to the schedule of the 
codification commission, it was planned to invalidate agreements with a unilateral 
arbitration option to elect a forum for dispute resolution. however, in the course of 
further legislative work, an approach was adopted whereby provisions of arbitration 
agreements that violate the principle of equality of parties should be invalidated. 
thus, if an arbitration agreement contains a provision on the right of only one party to 
choose between litigation and arbitration, such an agreement would be considered 
invalid in terms of granting such a party the right to seek arbitration.44
40  BGh (German Bundesgerichtshof ), 04.11.1992 – viii Zr 235/91, BGhZ 120, 108, 122.
41  BGh, 26.01.1989 – X Zr 23/87, BGhZ 106, 336.
42  Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration 140 (e. Gaillard & J. savage (eds.), 
the hague: kluwer Law international, 1999).
43  Зенькович Д.И. Асимметричные арбитражные соглашения в России и за рубежом // Междуна-
родное право и международные организации. 2013. № 4. С. 556 [dmitry i. Zenkovich, Asymmetric 
Jurisdiction Clauses in Russia and Abroad, 4 international Law and international Organisations 534, 
556 (2013)].
44  tadeusz erecinski et al., Kodeks postępowania cywilnego. Komentarz. Część czwarta. Przepisy z zakresu 
międzynarodowego postępowania cywilnego. Część piąta. Sąd polubowny (arbitrażowy) [Code of Civil 
Procedure. Commentary. Part Four: Provisions in the Field of International Civil Procedure. Part Five: 
Arbitration Court] (warszawa: LexisNexis, 2009).
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VIII (2020) Issue 3 96
Considering the above, it can be inferred that some of the continental jurisdictions 
would apply more general principles of law with respect to invalidation of forum 
clauses with asymmetric elements and in particular the principle of equality of the 
parties. however, even though asymmetric clauses provide an unequal allocation 
of rights between the parties, the argument that their concept is inconsistent with 
the procedural equality principle seems rather disputable, as will be illustrated in 
more details below.
1.3. Mutuality of Obligations
Another common justification for invalidation of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses 
within both civil and common law jurisdictions is lack of mutuality (i.e. reciprocity) 
between the parties. Generally, the mutuality principle requires that all terms and 
conditions of the contract should be applicable to all parties for the contract to be 
valid and enforceable. Otherwise, the contract must be rejected by the parties as 
having “an unfair advantage of partially applied rules under any legal agreement.”45 
england was one of the first jurisdictions that had a tendency to apply the concept of 
mutuality in respect of asymmetric clauses. Generally, under english jurisprudence, 
the approach to uphold jurisdiction clauses with unequal obligations has been fairly 
consistent since the 1940s.
For instance, in Woolf v. Collis Removal Service,46 a landmark case on this sub-
ject, the court considered an arbitration clause included in a contract between 
a warehouse operator and its customer and limiting the latter to bring claims before 
state courts. the english court found the clause valid, noting that there were no 
unequal elements to deprive it of the character associated with jurisdiction clauses 
in general. Nevertheless, already in the 1960s, there were contrary decisions, 
recognizing only those arbitration clauses that granted both parties equal rights to 
submit claims to arbitration. Analysing a clause granting only one party the right to 
seek arbitration, the english court in 1966 noted:
it is necessary that the arbitration clause be the consent of each party to 
the transfer of disputes to arbitration, either party should a dispute arise have 
the right to apply to arbitration[;]
in particular, a clause should be consistent with the principle of mutuality.47
45  See Arthur M. kaufman & ross M. Babbitt, The Mutuality Doctrine in the Arbitration Agreements: The 
Elephant in the Road, 22(2) Franchise Law Journal 101 (2002) (May 7, 2020), also available at https://
heinonline.org/hOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fchlj22&div=19&id=&page=.
46  Woolf v. Collis Removal Service [1948] 1 k.B. 11.
47  See Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 733 (Alphen aan den rijn: kluwer Law interna-
tional, 2009).
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Following the mentioned approach, until 1986, jurisdiction agreements were 
to be “reciprocal” in england, that is, to give both parties the same rights to submit 
a dispute to arbitration. in Tote Bookmakers Ltd. v. Development & Property Holding 
Co. Ltd.48 it was equally confirmed that the exclusive arbitration option of one party 
does not actually constitute an arbitration agreement. the rationale in this ruling was 
based on earlier practice,49 which in fact was not related to arbitration issues. however, 
this trend was not long-term and the said decision was overruled on the basis of the 
modern approach. Namely, a watershed in the jurisprudence of english courts was 
the case of Pittalis v. Sherefettin,50 in which the court refused to recognise the lack of 
reciprocity in such a clause, referring to the parties’ consent to the asymmetric clause. 
Afterwards, english courts refrained from emphasizing the reciprocity or symmetry 
principles as grounds for invalidation of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses.
having considered the english judicial system approach to the application of the 
mutuality principle, a similar conclusion can be drawn in respect of u.s. courts but 
with some exceptions.51 in the united states the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction 
clauses naturally depends on the laws and jurisprudence of each individual state. 
Prior to the 1990s, a significant number of u.s. courts did not recognise asymmetric 
arbitration clauses as valid on the basis of the doctrine of reciprocity of obligations. 
the application of this doctrine can be illustrated by the ruling in Hull v. Norcom, Inc.,52 
which concerned an arbitration clause, included in an employment contract, that 
provided only the employer with the right to bring claims before state courts. Applying 
the law of New york, the eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognised the arbitration 
agreement as unilaterally binding and, as a consequence, unenforceable. For the sake 
of fairness, it should be noted that subsequently in Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co. this 
judicial approach was rejected, thereby eliminating the application of any reciprocity 
requirement regarding the obligation or method of legal protection with respect to 
arbitration agreements. to a large extent, in its reasoning the court referred to the 
earlier case law and academic positions that rejected the mutuality doctrine.53
the application of the principle of reciprocity of obligations as a basis for 
invalidating jurisdiction clauses was also reflected in a number of recent decisions 
of the supreme Court of Arkansas. even nowadays Arkansas, considered a consumer 
48  Tote Bookmakers Ltd. v. Development & Property Holding Co. Ltd. [1985] 2 w.L.r. 603.
49  Baron v. Sunderland Corporation [1966] 2 Q.B. 56.
50  Alex Bevan, Optional Arbitration Agreements: The English Position, Commercial dispute resolution, 
30 November 2011 (May 7, 2020), available at http://www.cdr-news.com/categories/expert-views/
optional-arbitration-agreements-the-english-position.
51  See vladimir r. rossman & Morton Moskin, Commercial Contracts: Strategies for Drafting and Negotiating 
5–66 (New york: wolters kluwer Law & Business, 2013).
52  Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).
53  Walter v. Hoffman, 267 N.y. 365, 196 N.e. 291 (1935); Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.y. 490, 135 N.e. 861 (1922).
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friendly state, remains a highly controversial venue for application of the mutuality 
principle.54 in particular, in Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc., based on the 
rationale of Hull v. Norcom, Inc., it was decided that the clause lacked reciprocity of 
obligations, as the arbitration agreements
cannot be used as a shield against a judicial procedure initiated by the other 
party, while preserving only for the first party the sword of prosecution.55
this was upheld in E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, which emphasised that
the reciprocity of obligations is absent when one of the parties uses an 
arbitration agreement to protect itself from the trial, while retaining the right 
to seek protection in the judicial system.56
interestingly, this case concerned a symmetrical arbitration clause that did not 
apply to disputes falling under the jurisdiction of small claims litigation. however, 
the court decided that since it was not possible to assume on what other grounds 
the lender would have had to submit to arbitration its claim against the borrower, 
there was no reciprocity of obligations in the arbitration clause and, therefore, it 
was unenforceable.
Following the english courts’ approach, u.s. courts have also grown to accept the 
doctrine of reciprocity, on the basis of which courts previously refused to execute 
a jurisdiction clause granting only one party the right to seek arbitration. however, 
as it is fairly pointed out by some scholars, the doctrine of reciprocity has completely 
lost its meaning under contract law, as a result of which its application to jurisdiction 
clauses in support of the need to give all parties the same rights is no longer relevant. 
the mechanism of a unilateral clause is now generally considered an appropriate 
way for parties to exercise their autonomy of the will with respect to the dispute 
resolution procedure, unless such procedure is recognised as unfair in accordance 
with the applicable law.57 At the same time, it should be acknowledged that this 
conclusion is not absolute, since rulings still appear in which asymmetric arbitration 
clauses are invalidated because of violation of reciprocity requirements.58
despite the fact that the practice of Australian courts with regard to asymmetric 
clauses is not as extensive as in the united kingdom or the united states, there 
54  katherine B. Church, Arkansas and Mandatory Arbitration: Is the Feeling Really Mutual, 65(2) Arkansas 
Law review 343 (2012).
55  Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 342 Ark. 112, 27 s.w.3d 361 (2000).
56  E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 347 Ark. 132, 60 s.w.3d 436 (2001).
57  Born 2009, at 733–734.
58  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. West Suburban Imports, Inc., 411 F.supp.2d 970 (N.d. ill. 2006); Wisconsin Auto Title 
Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 280 wis. 2d 823 (wis. Ct. App. 2005).
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is nevertheless an interesting precedent that allows to draw some correlations 
within the common law perspective on the regulation of asymmetric jurisdiction 
clauses based on the mutuality doctrine. the case concerned a dispute arising 
from a construction agreement with a clause providing that the contractor would 
enjoy its exclusive right to initiate proceedings before the arbitral tribunal only if 
the contractor satisfied the multistep pre-trial procedure.59 unlike the appellate 
court, the supreme Court came to the conclusion that such clause constituted an 
arbitration agreement to the extent that the applicable law
extends to an agreement whereby the parties are obliged if an election is 
made, particular event occurs, step is taken or condition is satisfied (whether 
by either or both parties) to have their dispute referred to arbitration.60
hence, in this case the mechanism of forum election was recognised as an 
asymmetric clause that could be invoked by the beneficiary if the prescribed procedure 
was followed. At the same time, the Court recognised the validity of such clause as 
no restrictions to choose forum are established within the Australian legislation. it is 
important to note that the analysed decision was predominantly based on english 
jurisprudence and academic views, which once again proves the existence of patterns 
in approaches to asymmetric clauses among common law countries.
Most post-colonial jurisdictions have also adopted the approach of common 
law courts, which by that time had already reconsidered the applicability of the 
mutuality principle with respect to asymmetric clauses in Pittalis. For example, in one 
of the most cited cases before the hong kong Court was the question of the validity 
of a non-standard jurisdiction clause. while the clause was not asymmetrical in 
nature, the case had important implications with regard to the subject.61 the dispute 
in question involved an arbitration clause, according to which, if the parties were 
unable to settle their differences amicably, the customer was required to notify the 
contractor whether the differences were settled and such decision was binding until 
the moment when the project was considered completed. if the contractor was not 
satisfied, it had to notify the customer on the referral of the dispute to arbitration 
within 15 days following the receipt of the decision.
As a result, the contractor filed its claims with the court and the customer 
subsequently objected. Citing Pittalis, the court recognised the validity of such 
clause under Article 8(1) of the uNCitrAL Model Law,62 noting that failure to refer the 
dispute to arbitration by one of the parties did not make the clause unenforceable, 
59  PMT Partners Pty. Ltd. (In Liq.) v. Australian National Parks & Wildlife Service [1995] h.C.A. 36; (1995) 
184 C.L.r. 301.
60  Id. at 323.
61  China Merchant Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. v. JGC Corp. [2001] 3 h.k.C. 580.
62  uNCitrAL Model Law on international Commercial Arbitration 1985, u.N. doc. A/40/17, Annex i.
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VIII (2020) Issue 3 100
on the basis of which the court stayed the proceedings. Considering the above, two 
main conclusions may be drawn. First, if the party that enjoys the option to arbitrate 
fails to exercise such right within a particular time limit, it will be left without legal 
opportunity to bring claims before hong kong courts for their resolution. second, 
asymmetric clauses are likely to be recognised as valid by hong kong courts, which 
tend to follow the english courts’ approach in this respect.
Like in hong kong, the courts of singapore have followed the english approach. 
Namely, in 2016, the high Court of singapore addressed the question on unilateral 
jurisdiction clauses in considering a dispute arising out of a construction contract 
providing one of the parties with the exclusive right to refer a dispute to arbitration 
if it is not resolved by means of mutual negotiation.63 As a result of failure to reach 
a settlement, the option holder filed a claim with a state court rather than an arbitral 
tribunal, which was later unsuccessfully objected by the counterparty. in particular, 
the high Court of singapore in its line of argumentation determined that the clause 
was valid due to the following reasons: first, mutuality is not recognised as a vital 
element of an arbitration agreement under the singapore legislation on commercial 
arbitration; and second, only mutual consent of the parties to conclude an agreement 
plays a material role for the validity of the clause, even if it provides for an asymmetric 
allocation of rights.
Generally, singapore courts have affirmed validity of asymmetric clauses, 
stipulating, however, that they can become inefficient if the party with the 
exclusive option decides to choose a court instead of an arbitration tribunal; 
hence, arbitration remains an option rather than an obligation for future disputes 
(i.e. “future optionality”). that said, there were no objective grounds to suspend 
proceedings, since the relevant party had already taken advantage of one of the 
options designated under the clause. since the high Court of singapore did not draw 
a distinction between the types of asymmetric agreements, including arbitration 
agreements, which make arbitration mandatory subject to an express right to opt 
for litigation, the decision can be interpreted as a broad endorsement of the validity 
of forum clauses with asymmetric elements.
Apart from the Asian jurisdictions mentioned above, some interesting cases also 
emerged in indian court practice. enforceability of asymmetric clauses in india is 
more controversial due to inconsistent case law. Namely, historical analysis of indian 
court practice shows that courts in delhi tend to invalidate asymmetric jurisdiction 
clauses. this approach was rooted in indian law, which stipulates that arbitration 
agreements are subject to the principle of mutuality. in particular, the high Court 
of delhi concluded that asymmetric clauses are invalid since prior to the moment 
when the beneficiary elects the forum there is a lack of the mentioned mutuality.64 
63  dyna-Jet Pte Ltd. v. wilson taylor Asia Pacific Pte Ltd. [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 59.
64  Union of India v. Bharat Engineering Corp. [1977] 11 i.L.r. (delhi) 57.
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Nonetheless, recent approaches within indian court practice can show the contrary. 
For instance, the Calcutta high Court declined to follow the previous reasoning and 
came to the subsequent decision that an asymmetric clause is binding and effective 
as far as the parties agreed to enter into it, even though the enforceability of such 
clause is subject to one party’s intention.65
Furthermore, several recent cases, albeit not directly related, may indicate a ten-
dency to uphold symmetry as such within the legal field of india. Namely, in these cases 
the indian courts did not invalidate the clauses with unilateral right to appoint the 
arbitrator.66 Nonetheless, we believe that this conclusion should be taken with caution 
as it is more likely that indian courts will also consider some general principles of 
procedure in deciding on their jurisdiction, including convenience of the proceedings, 
the interests of justice and other. thus, even though some recent case law supports 
validity of asymmetric provisions in forum clauses, there is still uncertainty on their 
recognition within india and the regulation regime is far from settled. whilst the 
position to recognise such clauses as valid would correspond to the general approach 
evolving in common law jurisdictions and would fairly uphold parties’ intention at the 
time of drafting of asymmetric clauses, further clarity is needed.
summarizing the above, the mutuality principle can be considered as one of 
the most common justifications for invalidation of asymmetric clauses, especially 
in common law jurisdictions, although most of these jurisdictions have reassessed 
their approach with its application.
1.4. Good Faith
in the middle of the 1990s, u.s. courts, in invalidating asymmetric arbitration 
clauses, in order to justify the need for an element of reciprocity in an arbitration 
clause, began to apply the doctrine of good faith,67 which implies multilateral nature 
of contractual terms. the prevailing case law was made in California, where the 
legislation recognises the existence of substantial bad faith in arbitration agreements 
where the “weaker” party is entitled to bring claims before arbitration only, while the 
“stronger” one has the right to elect from various mechanisms of dispute settlement, 
including litigation. however, legal literature mentions that asymmetric arbitration 
clauses are expressly prohibited by Californian law as contradicting the good faith 
principle and one of the signs of this is the lack of reciprocity in such agreements.68
the forerunner of the u.s. court rulings that demonstrated the transition to 
the application of the principle of good faith was Armendariz v. Foundation Health 
65  New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., A.i.r. 1985 Cal. 76.
66  See, e.g., TRF Ltd. v. Energy Engineering Projects Ltd. [2017] 8 s.C.C. 377.
67  See david horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106(1) Northwestern university Law review 387 (2012).
68  Benjamin t. duranske, Virtual Law: Navigating the Legal Landscape of Virtual Worlds 383 (Chicago: 
American Bar Association, 2008).
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Psychcare Services, Inc. in this case the employees contested a forum clause, which by 
default mandated arbitration of all disputes related to unlawful dismissal, while the 
employer was solely empowered to bring claims before the court, thereby having 
more chances to protect its interests. in the ruling it was noted that the arbitration 
clause was included in the employment contract, which in its nature was a contract 
of adhesion and the terms of which could not be discussed or negotiated. thus, 
attention was drawn to the need for a “modicum of mutuality” in order for the 
arbitration clause in the contract of adhesion to be enforceable. the court explicitly 
emphasised that its decision was based on the doctrine of good faith, not mutuality, 
explaining that restricting the methods of legal protection caused the recognition 
of the arbitration clause to be “biased and unfair.”69
it is also worth to mention the case of Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 
where an asymmetric clause was recognised as violating the principle of good faith, 
which made it unenforceable in the contract between the lender and the borrowers 
(i.e. individuals). the arbitration clause in this case provided for the default referral to 
arbitration of all disputes related to the loan. At the same time, the creditor was granted 
the right to bring action in some courts of general jurisdiction in certain categories of 
disputes, including debt collection. the court concluded that the relative positions of 
the parties were “extremely unequal”; the terms of the contract were “unreasonably 
favourable with respect to the lender.”70 unlike similar cases, decisions on which had 
previously been based on the doctrine of reciprocity of obligations, the west virginia 
court reached a similar result by applying the doctrine of good faith.
A few months later, the Montana supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in 
Iwen v. U.S. West Direct.71 in this case, an attorney sued the company u.s. west direct 
with a claim for damages caused by improperly indicating his phone number in 
an advertisement posted in a telephone directory. the included arbitration clause 
stipulated referral of all disputes to arbitration except for the requirements of u.s. 
west direct about recovery of debts under the contract. having established that 
the clause formed a part of a contract of adhesion, the terms of which the claimant 
could not negotiate, the court declared that the clause violated the principle of good 
faith. subsequently, this decision was taken as the basis for the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc. concerning 
the validity of an arbitration clause incorporated in a franchise agreement.72
thus, a conclusion can be drawn that in some states courts still view the application 
of asymmetric arbitration clauses unfavourably, especially with regard to agreements 
concerning employment and consumer matters. For instance, some u.s. courts refused 
69  Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000).
70  Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 204 w.va. 229, 511 s.e.2d 854 (1998).
71  Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 293 Mont. 512, 977 P.2d 989 (1999).
72  Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 941 (9th Cir. 2001).
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to recognise asymmetric clauses in employment contracts due to violation of the good 
faith principle, i.e. such a clause cannot be enforced under the general principles of 
contract law as being unilateral and unfair.73 this approach is especially characteristic of 
courts which express “hostile attitude to arbitration agreements in general” in disputes 
involving “domestic” arbitration clauses.74 the same is substantiated by the legal opinion 
prepared for the Federal trade Commission and the u.s. department of Commerce on 
the use of alternative methods of resolving disputes in transactions involving consumers 
in the online market.75 in particular, the document states that many arbitration clauses 
compiled by large companies and imposed on individuals provide for the obligation 
of an individual to refer a dispute to arbitration for resolution, while the company has 
the right to choose from various mechanisms of dispute settlement.
Generally, the thesis of some American scholars that at present courts in the u.s. 
“have not come to a consensus on the feasibility of” asymmetric jurisdiction clauses 
remains quite relevant.76 within the u.s., some courts cite non-observance of the 
principle of mutuality or violation of the good faith principle to invalidate such clauses. 
For instance, in Hull Dye & Print Works Inc. v. Riegel Textile Corp. the court concluded 
that the clause that granted the right to seek arbitration to only one party lacked 
reciprocity and could not be enforced. similarly, in Kaye Knitting Mills v. Prime Yarn Co., 
Inc. the u.s. court quashed the arbitral award, pointing out that neither the agreement 
granting the right to arbitration to only one of the parties (invalidated by the court) 
nor the decision rendered on the basis of such an agreement was binding on the 
claimant. Meanwhile, other courts come to the opposite conclusion. thus, the trend to 
invalidate asymmetric clauses within the u.s. jurisprudence, although not dominant, 
still appears.77 Furthermore, those u.s. courts that invalidate asymmetric arbitration 
clauses adhere to the approach according to which these arbitration clauses are unfair 
to consumers. thus, considering the above, asymmetric clauses are recognised under 
the u.s. jurisprudence, unless such clauses violate the principle of good faith, which 
operates in addition to the principle of mutuality.
1.5. Party Autonomy
Among the various analysed examples that have established less favourable 
treatment of asymmetric provisions in forum clauses, the english case of NB Three 
73  See roger L. Miller & Gaylord A. Jentz, Business Law Today 95 (9th ed., Mason: south-western College/
west, 2010).
74  Born 2009, at 735.
75  international trade Administration, department of Commerce; Federal trade Commission, Public work-
shop: Alternative dispute resolution for Consumer transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace, 
65 Fed. reg. 7831 (2000).
76  See John dewar, International Project Finance: Law and Practice 448 (New york: Oxford university Press, 
2011).
77  Christopher r. drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27(4) Journal of Corporation Law 540 (2002).
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Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd., where the principle of party autonomy was 
emphasised, should also be mentioned. this was the first case that referred to 
practical operation of asymmetric clauses. the clause in question provided that 
the charterers were restricted from bringing any claims before courts of england, 
while the owner of the ship was also entitled to seek either arbitration or litigation 
in an english or other court considered competent under applicable international 
treaties. in the course of the dispute, the charterers initiated proceedings in england, 
while the owner exercised its option to arbitrate. the court stayed proceedings, 
emphasizing that the purpose of the arbitration law in england was to give parties 
autonomy to select a forum and generally pointing out that there was nothing 
contradictory to contractual principles in granting one party a “better” position with 
respect to choice of the forum.78
this approach was also upheld in Law Debenture Trust Corp. PLC v. Elektrim Finance 
BV & Ors.79 Although the matters under dispute were different from those settled 
in NB Three Shipping, the english court noted that the asymmetric clause should 
be treated in the same way as any other advantageous term of a contract, not as 
a deficiency. in particular, the default forum under the trust deed was arbitration 
with the trustee’s exclusive right to bring a claim before courts of england. Once the 
guarantor commenced arbitration proceedings, the trustee brought an action in 
court, claiming that its option was still valid. Based on the plain wording of the clause, 
the court pointed out that the beneficiary of the clause was entitled to exercise its 
exclusive option if it had not taken part in the action already initiated and there 
was no reasonable ground for the counterparty to assume that the beneficiary 
would not use the granted right. Otherwise, had the trustee brought its claims in 
an arbitration proceeding or failed to object thereto, it would have waived its right 
to opt for litigation. taking into account the absence of actions to indicate such 
waiver, the court proceeded with the case emphasizing, inter alia, that it was in the 
guarantor’s interest to agree and try to figure out what forum should be selected in 
order to avoid extra expenditures.
the mentioned cases demonstrate that english jurisprudence is quite consistent 
in upholding asymmetric jurisdiction agreements, although there are a relatively 
small number of judicial cases where a party without options tried to challenge 
clauses on the basis of optional nature. in most jurisdictions where there is a risk of 
parallel proceedings, the principle of primacy is essential, i.e. the court first seised 
has jurisdiction. As for the cases analysed, the outcomes were different and the 
courts found that the rationale of asymmetric clauses was for the protection of the 
beneficiary’s interests and thus its exclusive option was preserved even when the 
counterparty had already started the proceedings.
78  NB Three Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd. [2005] 1 Lloyd’s rep. 509.
79  Law Debenture Trust Corp. PLC v. Elektrim Finance BV & Ors. [2005] 2 Lloyd’s rep. 755.
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Most recently, the validity of unilateral optional arbitration clauses was similarly 
confirmed by the rulings in Deutsche Bank AG v. Tongkah Harbour Public Co. Ltd. 
and Deutsche Bank AG v. Tungkum Ltd. and Mauritus Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hestia 
Holdings Ltd. and another.80 in the latter case the asymmetric jurisdiction clause fell 
outside the Brussels i regulation as far as the parties, being domiciled in india and 
Mauritius, stipulated that jurisdiction of the english courts was a default rule, but 
granted one of the parties the right to commence proceedings in “any other courts 
in any jurisdiction.” the option holder commenced proceedings in england, whilst 
the other party challenged the english courts’ jurisdiction on the basis that the effect 
of the option was so unreasonable as to be inconsistent with english public policy. 
Applying english law, the court interpreted the clause to refer to “any court which 
would regard itself as of competent jurisdiction” and held that it was effective. it 
was also noted, referring to the reasoning in Rothschild, that even if the clause were 
to be interpreted as allowing the option holder to commence proceedings in any 
court in any jurisdiction, this would still have been enforceable on the basis of the 
party autonomy principle. Consequently, the rationale of the english courts in all 
the above-mentioned cases was that since the asymmetric clauses were agreed 
upon for the needs of the businesses, they should be considered valid even with 
the provision of unequal allocation of rights.
Nevertheless, the question of how the english courts would treat asymmetric 
clauses where a party is an individual becomes of current interest. some authors 
suggest that, although asymmetric clauses are typically used in commercial 
agreements, companies as parties to such clauses do not constitute a formal 
condition for their effectiveness and validity.81 At the same time, the result may be 
different in cases involving a consumer protection regime or clause assessment 
under the reasonableness test under the unfair Contract terms Act 1977.82 still, the 
significance of the analysed cases is very high, since it is very likely that they will 
serve as a reference point for courts in other common law jurisdictions.
it is interesting to mention that, although most civil law jurisdictions tend to 
invalidate asymmetric clauses, the latest case law of some countries within the 
european union has taken a more progressive approach in this regard. in particular, 
case law of spain shows that generally the concept of unilateral dispute resolution 
provisions is consistent with national legislation and its interpretation under regional 
regulation of the european union, even though it runs contrary to the dominant 
approach of French courts. As for case law of spain, until recently the issue of 
asymmetric clauses did not arise before the spanish courts. however, in 2013, the 
Madrid Court of Appeal considered a dispute between spanish and dutch companies 
80  Bérard et al., supra note 5.
81  draguiev 2014, at 26.
82  unfair Contract terms Act 1977 (May 7, 2020), available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/50.
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concerning a clause that provided for alternative jurisdiction of arbitration and 
litigation bodies in the Netherlands.83 the court declared the asymmetric clause 
valid and consistent with spanish law, referring to the principle of party autonomy 
and thus finding lack of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the dispute. it is more 
interesting to note that the spanish court indicated that the recognition of unilateral 
clauses as valid is consistent with the practice in other jurisdictions. however, as 
noted previously, still the main tendency within civil law countries centres on 
invalidation of such dispute resolution provisions in contracts.
hence, the evolution of the judicial practice from the rejection of unilateral 
provisions in jurisdiction agreements to their recognition within england can be 
noted. At the same time, unlike the French cases, the english decisions take a much 
stricter approach to enforcing the parties’ expressed choice. Asymmetric options are 
considered enforceable and legitimate, and the asymmetric nature of an agreement 
is not regarded as a cause for invalidation.
2. Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses Under the Principles  
of International Civil Law and Procedure
Considering the analysis above, several arguments can be constructed on the 
basis of which courts would treat unilateral clauses as null and void. in spite of these 
arguments, which seek to outline the pitfalls associated with the view that asymmetric 
clauses should be invalid, if it is assumed that a unilateral clause nevertheless features 
a significant defect, it becomes even more important to consider the possible avenues 
to sever the defective provision and preserve the agreement between the parties, 
although not with the initial content wholly intact. there should be a policy basis 
underlying the particular instruments suggested to be used for rectification. this 
section considers the most common grounds for invalidating asymmetric jurisdiction 
clauses as well as the possible ways of their reassessment.
2.1. Party Autonomy and Contractual Principles
Party autonomy is a fundamental principle of every legal system, and private 
international relations are not an exception in this regard. still, as shown above, some 
of the national adjudicatory bodies express positions that interpret this principle 
much more broadly, in such a way that sometimes the “weaker” party tries to use this 
interpretation for the purpose of ex post protection of its interests by declaring the 
asymmetric jurisdiction clauses null and void. Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny the 
fact that the concept of jurisdiction clauses is the quintessential expression of the 
party autonomy principle. As far as both parties to the agreement clearly expressed 
83  See Paula hodges QC et al., Madrid Court of Appeal Affirms Optional Dispute Resolution Clause, 
Lexology, 13 december 2013 (May 7, 2020), available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=700f5036-8e7d-4579-bc49-315b9455d1a2.
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their intention to derogate from the established jurisdiction and adopt a specific 
mechanism for resolving a potential dispute, there is no reason to invalidate an 
asymmetric jurisdiction clause completely and render it ineffective unless the defect 
involves a fundamental violation, such as coercion, error, dishonesty, incapacity or 
other legal issues.
thus, the general approach adopted by courts should be in favorem validitatis.84 
At the same time, interpretation of asymmetric clauses should be based on their 
special features, including their complex and optional nature that provides unilateral 
benefit to one of the parties. Consequently, if a court interprets a clause in a way that 
damages its cohesion and integrity, preservation of party autonomy should be of first 
priority, although it can be done partially. in other words, norms of applicable private 
international law should not have effect and establish the jurisdiction which would 
be determined if parties had not included any clause. Contrary to that, national 
courts, when considering the validity and enforceability of asymmetric clauses, 
should take into account that the parties have explicitly agreed and expressed that 
they wish for their dispute to be considered and adjudicated in a certain manner, 
which is far different from what is generally expected.
this argumentation can be similarly applied to asymmetric clauses with a more 
complex design, providing both arbitration and prorogation options. Nowadays, 
arbitration, being independent from state courts’ jurisdiction, is becoming increasingly 
popular, as it is associated with an impartial and confidential procedure, as well as 
a more flexible and efficient dispute resolution mechanism. Most jurisdictions with 
a favourable policy in respect of arbitration commonly adopt or implement rules 
envisaged in the uNCitrAL Model Law (e.g. German Civil Procedure Code, sec. 1032; 
French Civil Procedure Code, Arts. 1446 and 1448; u.s. Federal Arbitration Act, sec. 3; Law 
of the russian Federation No. 5338-i on international Commercial Arbitration, Art. 8),85 
including the rules requiring court proceedings to be stayed or terminated, thus 
providing an effective and independent arbitration regime. recent court practice of 
civil law countries also suggests that the presence of an arbitration clause should be 
interpreted in favour of the parties’ intention to ensure that their disputes are decided 
by the arbitral tribunal. For instance, this position was taken by the German court, 
which affirmed the same conclusion stressing its universal application.86 Considering 
this, it seems that there are enough reasons to promote such approach as a general 
principle in the treatment of asymmetric clauses.
Another reason for invalidation of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses is indirectly 
linked to the principle of party autonomy, including the institution of potestative 
conditions, which was discussed previously. in the classical approach under the 
84  See Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 42, at 262.
85  draguiev 2014, at 35.
86  schiedsvZ 2007, 215 (heft 4) ihr 4/2007, 163 f.
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continental doctrine, potestative conditions are dependent on the intention of 
one of the parties. therefore, they are typically considered void, since the debtor 
may unilaterally effect changes in the position of the other party and even, more 
importantly, evade its obligations. Currently, potestative conditions that depend on 
the debtor are to some extent prohibited in jurisdictions of the French approach (e.g. 
French Civil Code, Art. 1174; Quebec Civil Code, Art. 1500; italian Civil Code, Art. 1355; 
spanish Civil Code, Art. 1.115), despite the fact that there is no formal prohibition 
of such conditions under the control of the creditor. in the newest european 
codifications (i.e. the Civil Code of the Netherlands, German Civil Code) and the acts of 
the unification of private law (i.e. the uNidrOit Principles, the Principles of european 
Contract Law) there is no prohibition of conditions on the debtor’s side.87
Nowadays, the question on the application of this legal institution to jurisdiction 
clauses, as illustrated above, remains rather controversial, although such clauses 
provide an option to one of the parties and serve as a preventive mechanism against 
optional, arbitrary, unpredictable or unilateral actions of another.88 Nonetheless, the 
model of creditor-debtor relationships is deemed to be unsuitable for the institution 
of jurisdiction clauses, which aimed to designate a relationship that would form in 
case of escalation of a dispute.89 whilst jurisdiction clauses constitute a procedural 
contract under the continental approach, it is still difficult to identify the parties 
thereto as simply a creditor and a debtor, since in this case the transfer of property or 
proprietary rights is completely absent, and the rights arising in favour of the parties 
have a completely different character. it is presumed that the use of potestative 
conditions aims to prevent unilateral exercise of discretionary powers under an 
agreement between private parties. Nonetheless, if such power is deemed present, 
would it be exercised subject to a set of requirements agreed in advance? the purpose 
for the application of potestative conditions in this case would be lost, and it can 
be assumed that a one-sided jurisdiction clause by its nature appears to contain 
preconditions, i.e. an arising dispute cannot be considered as arbitrary.
however, this conclusion can be hardly applied from an arbitration perspective, 
especially considering such cases as NB Three Shipping Ltd. v. Harebell Shipping Ltd. in 
the mentioned case the beneficiary of the arbitration option was granted power to 
prevent judicial proceedings under the clause. At the same time, it should be noted 
that there would be no efficiency or sense in the arbitration element of the clause if it 
87  See Агеев А.В. Проблемы регулирования потестативных условий // Вестник экономического 
правосудия Российской Федерации. 2015. № 1. С. 84–106; № 2. С. 39–87 [Alexey v. Ageev, Regulation 
Problems of Potestative Conditions, 1; 2 Bulletin of economic Justice of the russian Federation 84; 39 
(2015)].
88  See Jacques Ghestin, La notion de condition potestative au sens l’article 1174 du code civil in Etudes 
dédiées à Alex Weill 243 (Paris: dalloz, 1983).
89  Pascal Ancel & Gilles Cuniberti, One Sided Jurisdiction Clauses – A Casenote on Rothschild (2013) (May 7, 
2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226551.
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did not involve such an advantage. From the commercial perspective, this argument 
becomes even more relevant and shows the general approach of english courts to 
support the justification of business considerations in contracts. the mentioned case 
acts as the only case on this issue, because the subsequent practice did not face the 
same type of clauses. even though english law may endorse such an approach, it is not 
clear whether other jurisdictions will follow the same interpretation and how a similar 
jurisdiction clause will function under particular national legislation on arbitration.
Although the principle of mutuality is of a great significance, connoting such 
concepts as equality and justice, still “symmetry is not justice and the so-called 
requirement of mutuality of obligation is now widely discredited.”90 however, 
some courts did not refuse to find asymmetric clauses invalid solely due to the fact 
they were inconsistent with the reciprocity principle. such conclusions are riskier 
in commercial conditions, where a certain extent of inequality and imbalance in 
allocation of the parties’ rights and obligations is a natural aspect of contractual 
and business relations.
2.2. Balance and Equality of the Parties
the predominant number of precedents on asymmetric clauses concerns financial 
and other contractual arrangements between commercial organisations, thus posing 
a question whether courts have sufficient level of competence to renegotiate and 
alter conditions of contracts intentionally established between business entities. 
despite the fact that having stronger negotiating and bargaining power, lending and 
financial institutions most commonly act as option holders, the commercial essence 
of credit facility relationships predetermines such more favourable provisions, which 
can result in an obvious imbalance of the parties’ rights.
According to the civil law doctrine, private relationships generally can be divided 
into general ones and those of commercial nature, which may arise only between 
enterprises that engage as professional business entities and consequently enjoy 
a different status. Contrary to that, the common law approach does not draw such 
a strict line of a commercial setting, trying to use objective criteria and considering 
whether the contract involves business turnover or not.91 however, the common 
feature of both legal systems is that they developed a lex specialis of consumer 
regime, which has a higher level of protection compared to the “commercial” one, 
although there is no universal concept or exact definition.92
Generally, it can be presumed that the risk of an asymmetric clause being 
invalidated is higher if the parties to such agreement are individuals, especially 
90  drahozal 2002, at 543.
91  See, e.g., Commercial and Consumer Law 10 (M. Furmston & J. Chuah (eds.), harlow: Pearson, 2010).
92  See Comment to the Preamble to the uNidrOit Principles 2010, para. 2 (May 7, 2020), available at https://
www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-2010/418-preamble/862-
preamble-purpose-of-the-principles.
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consumers. From the theoretical viewpoint, it is quite logical and reasonable. still, 
in some jurisdictions the right of the consumer to derogate from the special regime 
is strictly limited or even completely excluded (e.g. German Civil Procedure Code, 
sec. 1031; Austrian Civil Procedure Code, sec. 617; swedish Arbitration Act, sec. 6; 
italian Civil Code, Arts. 1341 and 1342).93 Nonetheless, the reasoning in some of the 
analysed court decisions is not based on the subjects’ status, for instance, in the 
Rothschild case. Consequently, these decisions seem to generally favour invalidation 
of asymmetric clauses. Additionally, it raises the question on justification for the 
distinction between relationships that are commercial in nature and those that are 
not: in most situations, courts seem to uphold arguments based on the equality and 
imbalance of the parties despite their actual status.
More often, such imbalance lies in the very process of drafting a jurisdiction 
clause, which as mentioned previously can be an obvious and inherent feature of 
the parties’ relationship, especially with regard to their negotiating status and power. 
thus, in fact, one of the parties has to comply and agree with the disadvantageous 
conditions of the clause and the whole agreement in general. At the same time, it 
should be noted that commercial contracts may contain many similarly unbalanced 
terms, which are not deemed invalid unless they violate peremptory norms of law.94 
in such situations, courts tend to turn to more general and amorphous principles, 
such as justice, morality and good faith; however, the interpretation and application 
of such provisions is explained on a case-by-case basis, which impairs their universal 
applicability.95 it appears that this entire approach has more negative consequences, 
since it not only violates the certainty of interpretation, but also allows to break 
down any agreed provision.
At the same time, in the event of a dispute where one of the parties has chosen 
the institution to submit the claim, the choice of the court crystallises, excluding 
the possibility of seeking another dispute resolution venue. hence, as some 
authors note, the imbalance would be automatically addressed at the stage when 
the dispute is actually settled. however, the same conclusion is not applicable to 
situations where a jurisdiction clause establishes an imbalance of interests with 
regard to the dispute resolution procedure itself, for example, when the procedure 
for appointing arbitrators or provision of evidence is less favourable to one of the 
parties. Consequently, such imbalanced features would be valid after the choice of 
a competent institution is authorised.
As a rule, legal literature, as well as some jurisprudence, considers a clause 
asymmetric if it grants one of the parties a more favourable position in terms of 
choosing a dispute resolution body. still, this position is rather disputable since 
93  Commercial and Consumer Law, supra note 91, at 113.
94  Law Debenture Trust Corp. PLC v. Elektrim Finance BV & Ors., supra note 79.
95  See, e.g., Jean-Louis Bergel, Théorie générale du droit 185 (Paris: dalloz, 2003).
VASILY BAKUMENKO 111
asymmetric clauses only provide a wider range of rights to one of the parties, but do 
not limit or waive discretion of the other.96 in other words, each party to such clauses 
still has the right to bring claims and select a venue to present them. however, under 
asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, the “weaker” party (more often the debtor) always 
tends to claim violation of its rights on the basis of unequal position, but this cannot 
be considered fair. usually asymmetric clauses are used in loan agreements or other 
financial instruments and give the right to choose the forum to the creditor. such 
allocation of the rights seems quite balanced as far as it is the creditor who needs 
additional remedies for the protection of the money it lends. thus, in the normal 
course of events the creditor should be able to choose which court to use to get its 
money back, and there is no violation of the borrower’s rights, since it has no need 
to seek dispute resolution.
An alternative argument regarding violation of balance between the parties 
refers to the equality principle, which presupposes fair trial and efficient procedure 
and is directly violated by the mere principle of asymmetric clauses. For instance, as 
noted by the european Court of human rights, procedural equality
implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present his case … under conditions that do not place him at substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.97
Although the significance of the principle of equality of the parties is quite obvious,98 
still, some scholars suggested that it is proper to apply this principle to a procedure 
that has already commenced. Meanwhile, asymmetric clauses provide the option for 
election of a dispute resolution venue and lack effect on the arbitration or litigation 
procedure itself. For instance, this was confirmed in Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd. v. 
Hestia Holdings Ltd. & Sujana Universal Industries Ltd., where the court pointed out that 
the equality principle implies the “access to justice within the forum chosen by the 
parties, not to choice of forum.”99
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider in more detail the question of why the 
principle of equality of the parties is still not absolute. Firstly, the requirement of equal 
access to justice cannot be realistically applied in such a way that each party is actually on 
an equal footing in legal proceedings. this altruistic assumption is necessarily divorced 
from the complex realities of international commercial litigation, where equality at best 
is an illusion. secondly, it is difficult to understand why a freely concluded contract, in 
96  draguiev 2014, at 34.
97  eCthr, Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 14448/88, Judgment, 27 October 1993.
98  See european Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, e.t.s. 5, Art. 6.
99  Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hestia Holdings Ltd. & Sujana Universal Industries Ltd. [2013] e.w.h.C. 1328.
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the absence of severe violations of rights and intentions (e.g. bad faith or fraud), can 
be considered as a violation of the rights of the party. in an alternative but still related 
context, case law demonstrates that a party that admitted the exclusive jurisdiction 
of english courts cannot bring claims concerning violation of rights under Article 6 of 
the european Convention on human rights if an english court grants an injunction to 
prevent it from filing a claim elsewhere.100 even if Article 6 is involved in this context, it 
is rather disputable that it would apply to the party’s choice of jurisdiction.
that said, the principle of parties’ equality, as envisaged under the eChr, concerns 
the procedural position of the parties before a particular adjudicatory body, but not 
equality of choice of venue for trial. thus, some involuntary restrictions of a party’s 
right to bring a claim, e.g. an injunction against a lawsuit that deprives the petitioner 
of an opportunity to sue in any place, may generally violate the requirement of access 
to justice. the principle will also be violated if the effect of limiting the choice of forum 
can be to force them into a court in which they do not receive substantial justice, 
but in such cases inequality in the choice of forum is not the source of injustice. the 
source of injustice is rather the scope of civil rights and duties of the party in court, 
which deprives them of a fair and impartial trial leading to a miscarriage of justice.
Considering the above, the question of whether the principle of equality can 
be applied to asymmetric clauses, which in turn do not affect the proceedings as 
such, becomes relevant. Meanwhile, the other most likely conclusion is that the 
mechanism under the clause is structured in such a way that the court (or arbitration 
institution) chosen in advance is one where the parties are in principle deprived 
of a fair trial in the course of the procedure already initiated. thus, considering the 
general good faith approach of parties and absence of intention to establish an 
option in respect of an especially unjust forum, it can be concluded that the principle 
of equality cannot affect the validity of hybrid clauses.
2.3. Means to Cure Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses
Considering the arguments presented above in favour of asymmetric clauses 
being recognised as valid under different concepts and civil law principles, still it is 
worth to consider the practical ways of treating such clauses, even if they are partially 
inconsistent with particular rules within different jurisdictions. the most effective 
instrument in this regard is deemed to be partial invalidity of contracts, also known 
as the severability principle in respect of jurisdiction clauses.
the mentioned instruments are generally available within the legislation of 
most civil law jurisdictions under contract law (e.g. French Civil Code, Art. 1157; 
German Civil Code, Arts 134, 139; italian Civil Code, Art. 1419; Civil Code of the 
russian Federation, Art. 180, etc.).101 in this light, the continental theory of law 
100  OT Africa Line Ltd. v. Hijazy (No. 1) (The Kribi) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s rep. 76.
101  draguiev 2014, at 43.
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generally recognises dispute resolution clauses as either “agreement on procedural 
issues”102 or “contract to refer,”103 and the severability principle is similarly applicable 
in respect of the latter. some common law jurisdictions recognise this principle as 
well.104 For instance, in Booker v. Robert Half Intern., Inc. the court, taking into account 
the policy favouring alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, upheld the validity 
of the arbitration clause even though it contained an invalid provision on punitive 
damages.105 that said, if a dispute resolution clause is valid only in part (e.g. the 
asymmetric option in an asymmetric arbitration clause is inconsistent with applicable 
law), there are neither policy, nor practical reasons to invalidate such clause in its 
entirety and disregard the mutual intention of the parties.
Considering this rule in respect of entire contracts, the argumentation based 
on per argumentum a fortiori should be applicable to the corresponding parts of 
such contracts. thus, if a particular term of a contract can be separated without 
any negative effect on other provisions, the same approach should be applicable 
with respect to hybrid clauses. inconsistencies with applicable law, which do not 
make such clauses void per se, should be treated by separation of defective parts 
from lawful ones. such approach seems to preserve the general principle of party 
autonomy and, consequently, the legal certainty on the treatment of terms agreed 
between the parties. Assuming there are grounds for holding a clause defective, 
only the defective part of an asymmetric clause should fail. At the same time, the 
part to be voided should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
in light of the above-mentioned principles, the part of an asymmetric clause that 
establishes arbitration for both parties should be considered valid. On the contrary, if 
the part stipulates an undefined number of venues (as was the case in Rothschild), it 
should be regarded as defective. Applying the same reasoning, if litigation is the only 
option on both sides, the effective part would be the one that gives both parties equal 
rights to elect forum. Generally speaking, the rationale of this approach is to make 
footing between the parties balanced and equal, presuming that the absence thereof 
constitutes a defective element in itself. Furthermore, application of such severance 
rules would also counter the risk of potestative conditions or fair trial objections.
Another option to cure asymmetric jurisdiction clauses inconsistent with 
regulations under a particular jurisdiction involves the contrary instrument. in 
particular, this approach entails not severing but expanding the clause with a view 
to bringing the parties into the same position by restoring their rights’ balance 
and equality. this approach was smoothly taken in RTK v. Sony Ericsson, where the 
russian court extended the provisions of the asymmetric jurisdiction clause to the 
102  Cour d’appel de Paris, Sam v. Perin, 8 octobre 1998 [1999] revue de l’arbitrage 350.
103  Pittalis v. Sherefettin [1986] 2 All e.r. 227, 331.
104  See, e.g., Ailion v. Spiekermann [1976] 2 w.L.r. 556.
105  Booker v. Robert Half Intern., Inc., 315 F.supp.2d 94 (d.d.C. 2004).
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other party, thus making it symmetric. Nonetheless, the approach of the supreme 
Arbitrazh Court taken in the mentioned case should be applied with caution. First, 
as a rule, courts do not have the authority to amend contracts, unless a party 
petitions for the contract to be amended in the manner prescribed by law. second, 
we presume that this approach can be applied only in a case where an asymmetric 
clause grants only one party the option to litigate; otherwise, it loses any rationality 
and applicability as it is difficult to imagine that a national court would expand the 
arbitration element to another party.
to conclude, the mentioned approaches to cure asymmetric jurisdiction agree-
ments are rather effective, although their application results in an original symmetric 
model of a dispute resolution agreement, depriving the designed mechanisms of 
any economic and conceptual rationale they were intended to have. Nonetheless, 
courts in most jurisdictions do not use even the mentioned approaches and 
instruments to invalidate asymmetric clauses domestically; thus, their application 
would generally be viewed positively with regard to predictability and the party 
autonomy principle.
Conclusion
Although the analysis of foreign legislation and case law carried out with respect to 
validity and enforceability of asymmetric clauses is not exhaustive, it still allows to draw 
some conclusions. Generally, two different approaches to validity and interpretation of 
unilateral clauses within common and civil law countries can be identified: while the 
former tends to recognise such clauses as valid and enforceable, the latter invalidates 
them on the basis of inconsistency with general principles of law. however, it is worth 
to note that there is no sharp boundary line between these approaches, as shown 
by recent court practice of civil law jurisdictions (e.g. italy and spain). to be more 
precise, it is difficult to assert that there is a certain jurisdiction that is ab initio hostile 
to asymmetric clauses. More commonly, courts approve jurisdiction agreements of 
asymmetric nature, recognizing them as valid and enforceable. still, this practice is not 
universal and absolute. For instance, relatively recent approaches, especially those 
upheld by the highest courts, raise additional issues on validity and enforceability of 
asymmetric clauses in some countries. At the same time, despite the negativity that 
may have emerged, some continental jurisdictions have confirmed asymmetric clauses, 
which led to a further increase in the flow and unpredictability in the studied area.
the most typical grounds on which national courts invalidate asymmetric 
jurisdiction clauses are: the concept of potestative conditions; the inclusion of such 
a clause in an adhesion contract; and violation of the principles of equality of parties, 
good faith, reciprocity or mutuality by contractual terms. Meanwhile, the principle 
of good faith is the only principle within case law that serves to support validity of 
asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, although its application is rather limited.
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At the same time, we believe there is a number of ways to reassess the established 
practice in a number of countries with regard to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses from 
the perspectives of general principles of law and legal policy. First, as imbalance 
of parties’ rights and obligations is a natural and common element of commercial 
contracts, which are not deemed invalid unless they violate peremptory norms, it 
cannot serve as a basis for asymmetric clause invalidity, unless such clause constitutes 
gross violation of law or a party’s rights. second, the principle of equality of the 
parties cannot be applied as an argument for invalidation of asymmetric clauses 
since it can be applied only to a procedure that has already commenced. however, 
this conclusion is most likely to be different if the clause is structured in such a way 
that the chosen forum will deprive a particular party (especially the one deemed to 
be “weaker”) of a fair trial in the course of the proceedings already initiated. Finally, 
the principle of severability of contracts and expansion of contract provisions by the 
court are deemed to be the most effective methods to save asymmetric clauses if 
their provisions contradict applicable national laws and regulations.
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